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THE SHIELD OF “UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES”: ANALYZING VENTURE
CAPITAL’S DEFENSE AGAINST INCREASED
CARRIED INTEREST TAXATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress is considering two bills to treat carried interest, popular with
private equity firms for its low tax rate, as just another form of general
income for tax purposes. 1 As the debate over increasing taxation to 35%2
on profits for general partners of private equity firms and from multi-billion
dollar leveraged buyouts continues, other industries are becoming
concerned.3 The issue of taxation on carried interest is even more complex
than the headlines suggest. This is not only about buyout firms. In fact,
politicians like Senator Charles Schumer have refused to support tax
legislation that applies only to private equity4 and even the National
Association of Realtors has stepped forward.5 Venture capitalists also rely
on carried interest,6 and increased taxation would be a blow to their
profitability.
Other businesses are justifiably worried that congressional action will
lead to “unintended consequences,”7 and both investors in start-ups and
1. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). Carried interest is a unique
form of return on investment used by investment fund managers. Instead of being paid salaries,
fund managers actively invest client’s money and receive payment for their management services
with a percentage of the profits (interest) received on those investments.
2. The Taxation of Carried Interest: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong.
15 (July 11, 2007) (testimony of Peter R. Orszag, Director of the Congressional Budget Office),
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testpo.pdf
[hereinafter Orszag Testimony] (“[O]rdinary income for high-income taxpayers is typically
subject to a 35 percent marginal income tax rate and . . . [l]ong-term capital gains for such
taxpayers are typically subject to a 15 percent tax rate.”).
3. Jessica Holzer, Realtors Take Aim at Private Equity Tax Hike Plan, THE HILL, Aug. 3,
2007; Kevin Drawbaugh, Business Group Backs Carried Interest Tax Break, REUTERS, Sept. 4,
2007; Minority Group Joins Fight Over Carried Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007; Energy
master limited partnerships invest in and manage gas pipelines, which are capital intensive. See
David Givens, Gas Processors Report: Is The Carry Going to Get You?, Aug. 15, 2007, available
at 2007 WLNR 16173143.
4. Raymond Hernandez & Stephen Labaton, In Opposing Tax Plan, Schumer Breaks With
Party, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at A1.
5. Realtors are protesting tax increases on limited partnerships that rely on carried interest
and that commonly invest in real estate. Holzer, supra note 3 (“The fact of the matter is that real
estate is more broadly affected. It is a major stakeholder in this issue.”) (quoting Steve Renna,
senior vice president and counsel to the Real Estate Roundtable).
6. See Marco V. Masotti, Private Equity Funds: Current Terms and Trends, 1617 PLI/CORP
213 (2007). When venture capital funds invest in a company, they are given part ownership of the
enterprise, which is called a profits interest (an interest in the profits). The fund receives returns
on the investment when it realizes profits, but the portion of the return that the general partner
takes for himself is carried interest.
7. Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, National Venture Capital Association
Statement on Carried Interest Bill (June 22, 2007), http://www.nvca.org/pdf/
carriedinterestbillstatement.pdf.
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sellers in the real estate market alike may find that the market may shift
substantially if Congress decides to increase taxation of carried interest.
This note argues that a tax increase on carried interest is a good idea, and
private equity managers should be paying the same taxes that middle
America does.8 The “unintended consequences”9 of increasing carried
interest taxation are not as significant as 2007’s lobbying has made it seem,
and many industries that may be affected by carried interest taxation are
reasonable targets.10 Furthermore, proposed legislation will not increase
taxes on all carried interest.11 Venture capital firms should be especially
concerned because the strength and nature of venture capital business
indicates that they should be more than a mere unintended target.
The debate on carried interest also necessarily focuses on the
underlying policy reasons for tax incentives in investment.12 Closing tax
loopholes is commonplace and market economies are structured to respond
to changing taxation naturally.13 There is money to be made in investment14
and Congress should not believe the arguments made against increased
taxation. Venture capitalists argue that they are unique in the carried interest
debate and that they should be spared higher taxation for the sake of the
American economy,15 but ranking Senate members in Washington are not
easily convinced16 and there are many reasons to place venture capital in the
same tax bracket as middle America.

8. The average American worker pays the general income tax, which can be as high as 35%.
Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, Myths and Facts About Private Equity Fund Managers –
and the Tax Loophole They Enjoy (July 2007).
9. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 7.
10. For discussion, see Part V.C.
11. Entrepreneurs who do not provide investment services and carried interest proportionate to
personal investment will not be taxed. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
12. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77 (Fall 2005).
13. See Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-20, 2007) (arguing that firms using carried interest have a
variety of choices including shifting the tax burden if the carried interest loophole is closed).
14. Actual profit figures are unavailable because partnerships do not provide annual reports
and investments paid out in carried interest are not taxed until realized, which is upon sale of a
portfolio company.
15. GLOBAL INSIGHT, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE
CAPITAL BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 5 (4th ed. 2007),
http://www.nvca.org/pdf/NVCA_VentureCapital07.pdf (“Venture capital backed companies
outperformed their non-ventured counterparts in job creation and revenue growth.”).
16. Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, Carried
Interest, Part 1: Opening Statement of Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) (July 11, 2007), available at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/statements/071107mb.pdf (“The United States economy
is strong and dynamic. Our entrepreneurship creates new jobs. We do not want to stifle the mother
of invention. On the other hand, we wish to ensure fair treatment under the tax code.”); see also
Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member of the S. Comm. on Finance, Statement of
Sen. Chuck Grassley, Hearing, Carried Interest, Part 1 (July 11, 2007), available at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/statements/071107cg.pdf (“We can’t allow the carried
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To understand why the proposed carried interest taxation is reasonable,
it is necessary to look at why capital gains taxation exists. Venture
capitalists believe that their returns on investment are distinct from other
common issues of carried interest compensation. However, the reality of an
efficient market and underlying policy issues suggest that venture capital
should not be treated differently. Part II of this note provides a survey of the
venture capital industry, including its recent growth and role in the
American investment marketplace and explains how the industry will be
affected by increased taxation. It also examines the nature of risk-taking (an
issue to be addressed further in Part V.A) and profitability in the venture
capital industry. Part III provides an introduction to carried interest and the
lower capital gains taxation rate. It explains which industries commonly
structure their businesses to take advantage of lower taxation and the
difference between the proposed bills on carried interest. Part IV gives a
survey of recent tax reform that affected venture capital.
Part V addresses the arguments made by venture capitalists against
increased taxation. Part V.A addresses the effects of changing the
cost/benefit equation established in the industry, which includes the risktaking nature of the industry, the need for providing incentives to fund
managers, and the likelihood that opportunities in the global investment
landscape will encourage an exodus of American venture capital firms and
managers. Part V.B provides justifications for altering the present definition
of carried interest and treating it as income from services rendered as
opposed to capital gain. Finally, Part V.C addresses the effects of shifting
the tax burden, how other industries and investors will be affected, and how
the policy reasons behind proposed legislation indicate that the venture
capital industry is not an unintended casualty.
II. SURVEY OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY
Venture capital funds invest in companies that have not had a public
offering of stock.17 Those companies market themselves to venture
capitalists to attract investments when they need a significant capital outlay
to expand their businesses.18 In return for providing money,19 venture
capitalists are given equity in the business, and often a negotiated number
of director seats so that the venture capital fund has a say in the

interest tail to wag the capital gains dog . . . I wouldn’t call it a no-brainer that all those [carried
interest] profits should be taxed as a return on investment rather than a return on labor.”).
17. Masotti, supra note 6, at 215.
18. Id. at 215–16.
19. Venture capitalists typically provide between $10 million and $15 million in return for an
ownership position. See Dwayne Moyers & Crystal Detamore-Rodman, Pursing Venture Capital:
Determine Whether You’re a Good Candidate For Institutional VC Funding,
June
20,
2007,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/money/financing/
ENTREPRENEUR.COM,
venturecapital/article180654.html.
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management of the start-up.20 As such, venture capital funds do not simply
provide cash to start-up companies; they also provide market expertise and
constant, active management to help the business succeed and maximize its
value.21 The goal of a venture capital fund is to invest in a private company
and to expand the business until it can be sold for a profit to another
company, or until the venture company can issue stock in an initial public
offering (IPO).22 Arguably, an IPO is the best end-result for a venture
investment because the private market for sale of a company is much
smaller than the market for shares of a corporation. Therefore, a venture
capital firm will be able to get the greatest dollar amount offered for its
prior equity investment.
Companies are divided into “stages” that help define how early in their
business development they are prior to going public.23 Venture capital firms
use stages as an investment strategy to diversify the group of companies
they invest in and to consider what type of management assistance each
company will need. Furthermore, staging investments and investing with
other venture capital funds helps to limit the risk exposure of a fund.24
Venture capitalists do not solely invest in companies that are months away
from going public. In fact, less than half of the money invested in the
second quarter of 2007 was invested in “later stage” companies.25 During
that period, $221 million was invested in startup/seed companies, $1.388
billion was invested in early-stage companies, $2.377 billion was invested
in expansion companies and $3.142 billion was invested in later stage
companies.26 In total, “[v]enture capitalists invested $7.1 billion in 977
deals in the second quarter of 2007 — the highest level of deals reported in
a quarter since Q3 2001.”27 Those figures indicate that venture capitalists
can look forward to recording carried interest figures when their
investments are sold or go public.

20. “Carried Interest”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. at 5 (July 11,
2007) (testimony of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing Director of Scale Venture Partners), available at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testkm.pdf
[hereinafter
Mitchell Testimony].
21. Id.
22. Moyers, supra note 19 (if the company can neither go public or be acquired, there is little
opportunity for sufficient profit which would entice a venture capital fund to invest millions of
dollars).
23. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 52–53 (2006).
24. Id. at 42.
25. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MONEYTREE REPORT: Q2 2007 US RESULTS at 4
(2007),
available
at
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/
exhibits/2Q07MoneyTree_Report.pdf (“later stage” companies are predicted to be the companies
closest to an IPO).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Venture capital investments appear risky because only 20% of venturebacked companies “achieve realizable and meaningful gains.”28 Of the
remaining 80%, half “lose some or all of the invested money,”29 and half
“generate a modest profit.”30 To hedge their bets, “a venture fund might
make investments in ten or fifteen portfolio companies.”31 Because multiple
investments are required to spread the risk, venture capital funds will
require investors to commit to investment prior to selecting their portfolio
companies.32 Partners who invest money do not expect to see returns
immediately; due to the nature of investing in companies, investments are
usually for a period of five to ten years, at which time the company will
hopefully go public.33 The final realized profit on an investment is the
money raised from the IPO or sale.
III. CARRIED INTEREST AND ITS USE IN PARTNERSHIPS
Venture capital funds, buyout funds, hedge funds and “similar
alternative investment vehicles”34 (each is a type of “private equity” fund)
choose to structure their businesses as partnerships to avoid the corporate
tax rate as well as other burdensome corporate regulations.35 In a
partnership, profits pass through to the individual partners and the
government taxes each individual partner instead of the entity as a whole.36
The partnership structure gives businesspeople the flexibility to distribute
profits in a more tax-efficient manner by allowing each partner to be taxed
solely on his own investment.37 Private equity funds take advantage of that
efficiency by structuring the partnership to separate the profits of the
investors from those of management.38 Each investor becomes a limited
partner and the general partner is a separate management entity.39 Investors
provide the vast majority of capital, while the general partner manages the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Fleischer, supra note 12, at 87.
Knoll, supra note 13, at 2.
Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 7.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES,
PART I, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I].
35. Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“[N]oncorporate forms of conducting business . . .
were created in part to avoid the potential distortions associated with corporate taxation.”).
36. Testimony of Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Eric Solomon Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 110th Cong. 2 (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/
~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testes.pdf [hereinafter Solomon Testimony].
37. Id.
38. Even though a manager’s return is taxed the same as a limited partner’s, his carried interest
is contingent and is never proportionate to his own investment. See id.
39. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 3.
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fund, provides expertise in deciding what investments to make and consults
the companies it chooses in order to maximize the value of the investment.40
In a typical private equity fund, the general partner’s compensation is
“two and twenty.”41 For its services, the general partner receives a 2%
management fee and 20% of the profits.42 More successful and well-known
private equity funds can and do charge more.43 The management fee covers
“ongoing operational expenses of the manager, such as rent, salary and
other overhead items.”44 However, the real incentive for the manager is the
profits,45 because successful management nets the general partner one-fifth
of every dollar earned on the limited partner’s capital. “Carried interest” is a
term that describes the general partner’s interest in the profits of the
investment.46 Although 20% of profits may seem high when the general
partner provides little or no capital, there is no shortage of willing
investors,47 which suggests that 20% is a fair market rate. Investors prefer
carried interest over a larger, flat management fee because it is
economically efficient; it provides incentives for the general partner and, in
turn, protects the investors from disinterested management who would
otherwise collect a flat fee and have no incentive to actively monitor the
investment.48 Furthermore, venture capitalists prefer carried interest
specifically because tax legislation treats it as a return on investment.49
Returns on capital investments receive beneficial taxation compared to
general income, though there are exceptions.50
If capital investments are made for a period longer than one year, they
are taxed at a lower capital gains rate instead of the general income rate.51
40. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 5 (Limited partners in venture capital funds are
usually “institutional investors such as pension funds, universities and endowments, and private
foundations [that] typically provide between 95 to 99 percent of the capital for the fund”).
41. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds
(Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-27, 2007).
42. The management fee is typically 2% of the fund’s assets, not the profits. JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 3.
43. Masotti, supra note 6, at 223 (“a general partner with a strong track record may receive a
carried interest percentage of as high as 25% to 30%”).
44. Id. at 227.
45. Joseph W. Bartlett, Why Plan to Change Carry Tax is Misguided, VENTURE CAPITAL J.,
Aug. 2007, at 31.
46. Masotti, supra note 6, at 223.
47. Fundraising for venture funds increased every year from 2002 ($3.8 Billion) to 2006
($30.9 Billion), and “[t]he level of dollars raised by the firms suggests a continued demand by
institutional investors for quality venture capital investment opportunities.” Press Release, Nat’l
Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture Capital Fundraising Activity Healthy and Prudent in Second
Quarter of 2007 (July 16, 2007), http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q207VCFundraisingfinal.pdf (quoting
Mark Heesen, president of the NVCA).
48. See Fleischer, supra note 41, at 5.
49. See Knoll, supra note 13, at 4.
50. Capital investments made for less than one year do not qualify for the capital gains rate.
See id.
51. Knoll, supra note 13, at 4.
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The lower capital gains rate encourages long-term investments, which are
essential to economic growth.52 Limited partners’ returns on investment in
private equity funds are typically subject to the capital gains rate,53 but
general partners also manage to receive the same treatment because their
carried interest is profit from the capital investment made by the limited
partners. Although it is not the general partners’ money, tax law treats the
carried interest substantively as the same form of investment return. The
benefit to the general partner is significant: Tax on payment for
management is the 15% capital gains rate and not the 35% income tax.54 As
a result, managers of successful private equity funds earn millions of dollars
more than the average American, but are taxed at a far lower rate.55
Congressional response to the inherent tax inequalities in carried
interest tax treatment initially occurred as the result of a working paper by
Professor Victor Fleischer of the University of Illinois College of Law that
addressed the carried interest tax loophole and the inherent inequalities it
creates.56 After Professor Fleischer posted a draft of his paper online, Senate
staff contacted him to testify in a closed-door briefing.57 Soon after his
statements before select members of Congress,58 both the House and Senate
drafted laws to close the tax loopholes Professor Fleischer addressed.
However, the two bills have substantially different features. While the
Senate bill solely addresses a tax loophole for publicly traded partnerships
that often also use carried interest, 59 the House bill addresses partnerships
that go public as well as taxation of managers using carried interest.60
The House bill, H.R. 2834, addresses taxation of investment managers
that do not provide their own capital to a partnership. The bill treats
partnership profit interests as ordinary income if they involve “a substantial
quantity” of investment services including:

52. See Testimony of ACCF President Mark Bloomfield Before the Committee on Ways and
Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong. (March 19, 1997), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_house_hearings&docid=f:4861
6. pdf.
53. Knoll, supra note 13, at 4.
54. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 3 (compensation for services is usually taxed at
ordinary income rates).
55. See Fleischer, supra note 41, at 3 (“Almost nine times as many Wall Street managers
earned over $100 million as public company CEOs; many of these top-earners on Wall Street are
fund managers. And they pay tax on much of that income at a 15% rate, while the much-maligned
public company CEOs, if nothing else, pay tax at a 35% rate on most of their income.”).
56. Fleischer, supra note 41, at 6–7.
57. Jerry Crimmins, He Finds His Sudden ‘Fame’ a Bit Taxing, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 20,
2007, at 3.
58. Id.
59. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007).
60. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007). This note focuses solely on the debate over carried interest
taxation as it affects management of private partnerships, not tax loopholes that prevent the
corporate tax rate from applying to certain publicly traded partnerships.
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(A) Advising the partnership as to the value of any specified asset.
(B) Advising the partnership as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing,
or
selling
any
specified
asset.
(C) Managing, acquiring, or disposing of any specified asset.
(D) Arranging financing with respect to acquiring specified assets.
(E) Any activity in support of any service described in subparagraphs (A)
through (D).61

“Specified assets” include 1) securities, 2) real estate, 3) commodities, and
4) any options or derivatives with respect to the three.62
The bill avoids increasing taxation on capital investments to encourage
general partners to invest their own money in the partnership, because
partners are only taxed at the higher income rate if their portion of the
profits does not result from a proportionate share of personal capital
investment.63 Limited partners maintain the capital gains rate, but general
partners are taxed at the higher income rate for any profits received solely
as a result of management of a limited partner’s funds.64 Therefore, general
partners are taxed at 15% if they made a proportionate capital investment to
the other partners, but those who wish to receive compensation for their
management services cannot take advantage of the tax loophole by
receiving a carried interest instead of a management fee.65

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. If—
(i) a portion of an investment services partnership interest is acquired on account of a
contribution of invested capital, and
(ii) the partnership makes a reasonable allocation of partnership items between the
portion of the distributive share that is with respect to invested capital and the portion
of such distributive share that is not with respect to invested capital,
then subsection (a) shall not apply to the portion of the distributive share that is with
respect to invested capital. An allocation will not be treated as reasonable for purposes
of this subparagraph if such allocation would result in the partnership allocating a
greater portion of income to invested capital than any other partner not providing
services would have been allocated with respect to the same amount of invested capital.
Id. (subsection (a) provides that generally, carried interest will be treated as general income).
64. See id.
65. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 7. To provide some examples,
in situation 1, the general partner is compensated with a 2% management fee and a 20% carried
interest, but the limited partners provide all of the capital. Prior to H.R. 2834, the management fee
would be taxed at the 35% ordinary income rate and the carried interest to the general partner
would be taxed at the 15% capital gains rate. Subsequent to H.R. 2834, they would both be taxed
at the 35% ordinary income rate. In situation 2, the general partner receives the same
compensation, but he provides 10% of the capital invested. Prior to H.R. 2834, the management
fee would be taxed at 35%, but the carried interest would be taxed at 15%. Subsequent to H.R.
2834, the management fee would still be taxed at 35%. However, because the general partner
provided 10% of the capital but received 20% of the profits, one-half of his carried interest would
be taxed at the 15% capital gains rate because it was the proportionate profits to his investment.
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Private equity firms ominously argue that the result of H.R. 2834 will
not simply be an increased tax burden for them. Their complaints fail to
recognize that there will be some positive effects on the market, however.
First, tax revenues will initially increase as the result of the carried interest
loophole closing.66 Second, taxation of investing will become more efficient
as long-term capital investment continues to be encouraged, without
allowing managers with limited personal capital risk to reap a
disproportionate share of the profits.67 Finally, general partners will be
encouraged to invest their own money if they want to maximize their own
profits, thereby increasing their own risk and in turn protecting investors to
a greater extent by aligning the interests of the investors and the managers.68
IV. RECENT HISTORY OF TAXATION REFORM
There is a long history of taxation reform and its effects on venture
capital, though some of the most important tax changes have occurred
within the last forty years. “Prior to 1979, pension funds were severely
limited by” the “Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA)
‘prudent man’ rule.”69 Pension funds represented one of the largest groups
of institutional investors,70 who were and are to this day responsible for a
substantial portion of investment capital in the American economy.71 To
expand investment opportunities, the prudent man rule was changed to
allow managers of pension funds to invest a maximum of 10% of their
fund’s capital in higher-risk investment opportunities, including venture
capital funds.72 The influx of capital increased “annual new contributions to
venture capital funds from $100–200 [million] during the 1970s to in excess
of $4 billion by the end of the 1980s.”73 However, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 quickly cut into that increase in capital investment when it removed

The remaining one-half would be taxed at 35% because it was profits paid directly as a result of
the general managers services, not capital.
66. Knoll, supra note 13, at 10–12 (“[P]rivate equity funds raised more than $200 billion in
2000 and 2006, but less than that in all other years . . . [a]ssuming $200 billion is invested each
year in private equity funds, the additional tax collected would amount to between $2.6 billion and
$4.2 billion a year.”).
67. AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
“CARRIED INTEREST” CONTROVERSY 2 (rev. Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/731-07tax.htm (“Generally speaking, a tax system is more efficient when it treats like activities
alike: rather than having tax rates determine how people allocate their resources, it is better for the
tax system to create a level playing field.”).
68. General partners will receive the same return on investment as limited partners, so their
interests will be more aligned. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 94–95.
69. Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 13 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 1, 2
(1994).
70. See id. at 13 (by 1988, pension funds were the largest investors in venture capital).
71. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 19.
72. Gompers, supra note 69, at 2.
73. Id.
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the lower capital gains rate and taxed capital gains as ordinary income.74
One swift legislative move thus destroyed the main tax incentive to longterm investment: “[V]enture-capital investment fell from roughly $4 billion
in 1987 to under $1.4 billion” in 1991 because of the increased taxation.75
Twenty-two years after the precipitous drop, Congress passed the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003.76 The act lowered the
capital gains rate to 15%, and later bills extended capital gains tax
protection through 2010.77 Investing in the second quarter of 2007 was the
highest since 2001.78 Clearly, taxation reform has historically had a
dramatic effect on venture capital.
However, the present proposed legislation has a much more limited
scope than previous tax changes. Unlike the limitations on investment made
by the “prudent man” rule, taxation on carried interest will only directly
affect general partners, not investors.79 Limited partners in venture capital
funds are still taxed at the capital gains rate because they do not use carried
interest.80 The legislation proposed is also dissimilar to a change in the
capital gains rate: Increased taxation of capital gains affects all investors in
venture capital funds, but taxation of carried interest only directly affects
venture capital managers’ profits.81 While capital gains taxation may make
investment overall less profitable, only a tiny fraction of investors today
who would normally be affected by broad capital gains taxation use carried
interest.82 Venture capitalists are concerned by congressional attempts to
increase tax on carried for one reason: profit. However, their justifications
for maintaining the tax loophole are not quite as simple.

74. Steve Lohr, Venture Capital: Looking For Stars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992 (the Reagan
administration intended to simplify the tax system by treating capital gains and general income the
same).
75. Id.
76. Press Release, The White House, President Signs Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (May 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/05/20030528-9.html (“The benefits of the Jobs and Growth Act will also go to
investors. The top capital gains tax rate will be reduced by 25 percent, which will encourage more
investment and risk-taking, and that will help in job creation.”).
77. Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 § 102, H.R. 4297, 109th Cong.
(2006).
78. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1.
79. See Gompers, supra note 69, at 12 (noting that “capital gains taxation has a [relatively]
small impact on the amount of money flowing into the venture capital industry” because the
majority “of the money flowing into new funds is from tax-exempt sources”).
80. Carried interest is a form of return solely when there is no capital contribution by the
manager. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 3.
81. Presently, every partner’s return is treated as capital gain, but congressional legislation
would only affect those partners that did not provide a proportionate capital investment. See H.R.
2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
82. Capital gains taxation would apply to the 95% of investment from limited partners
(assuming they are not tax-exempt), but carried interest taxation would only affect the remaining
5% from general partners. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 5.
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V. THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE
Venture capital funds believe that carried interest should not be taxed as
general income for three main reasons. First, the investment market has
already established a cost-benefit balance that will be upset by increased
taxation.83 Second, venture capitalists have built equity in their portfolio
companies by providing unique management services and therefore, their
profit should be treated as profit resulting from a capital gain.84 Finally,
taxing carried interest will have “unintended consequences,”85 affecting a
variety of industries that use carried interest, people that invest in those
industries, and the American economy as a whole.86 This note addresses
each of these arguments against carried interest taxation in turn.
A. CHANGING THE COST/BENEFIT EQUATION
To defend the present cost/benefit equation, venture capitalists highlight
the economics of venture capital and the other opportunities available for
investment. First, they believe venture capitalists will not enter the market if
profits are decreased.87 Second, tax benefits should exist for industries such
as venture capital that take significant business risk.88 Third, carried interest
is a necessary incentive to managers that protects investors and encourages
intelligent investing.89 Fourth, without the beneficial tax treatment of
carried interest, managers will leave the venture capital industry for greener
pastures.90 Finally, venture capital firms will be forced to transfer their
business to foreign countries with better tax structures for investing in startups.91 However, deeper review suggests the market will quickly adapt to
taxation of carried interest and venture capitalists’ concerns are taken to an
extreme.
1. Decreasing Profits
A direct effect of increased taxation will be to decrease the after-tax
returns that managers receive from investment in portfolio companies. By
decreasing profitability, a number of venture capitalists could be forced out
of the market, or at least discouraged from entering it.92 However,
83. Id. at 14 (“Our limited partners . . . must be assured that their costs of investing in venture
funds will not increase because the balance of partnership income is suddenly thrown off kilter.”).
84. Venture capitalists refer to the ownership rights created by management services as “sweat
equity.” See Id. at 6.
85. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 7.
86. See discussion infra Part V.C.
87. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 13 (“[W]e are still a small and fragile
industry.”).
88. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 56.
89. Id. at 59.
90. Bartlett, supra note 45.
91. Id.
92. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 13.
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investment at levels not seen since 200193 indicates that the venture capital
industry can withstand a shift of the cost-benefit equation.
Venture capitalists aim to portray themselves as both powerful and
responsible for the success of the American economy, but also weak and
barely profitable to the point at which applying the ordinary income tax
would force them to close up shop.94 In between 1991 and 2004, only about
35% of U.S. venture funds generated carried interest and therefore, few
funds were profitable.95 However, 11% generated $50 million or more, with
eight firms earning over $500 million in carried interest.96 At first glance,
those numbers indicate that the majority of venture capital firms cannot
afford increased taxation. However, 11% were making enough money to be
extremely profitable even if there were increased taxation, and if 35% of
firms generated carried interest, then 65% of venture firms during that same
period would not have been affected at all by a higher taxation rate.
Furthermore, as funds mature the amount of carried interest rises
dramatically.97 Therefore, many of those same funds can expect greater
returns than the above figures even suggest.
Of the 11,686 companies first funded98 between 1991 and 2000, only
18% are known to have failed, and 47% were acquired, went public, or are
going public.99 Considering the goal of venture capitalists is sale or an IPO,
and public offerings typically provide exponential returns to investment,100
those figures imply strong returns on investment. Furthermore, performance
indices show there are positive returns on average for venture capital funds’
investment outlook.101 Profits that are realized in one year are equal to
18.1% of capital invested; in ten years (the highest point) they are 21%, and
in five years (the lowest point) they are 2.7%.102 The one-year outlook is
almost double that of the S&P 500 and the ten-year investment outlook is
more than triple that of the S&P 500.103 In terms of present value to venture
capital managers, each $100 invested is worth $8.98 of carried interest and
93. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 25, at 5.
94. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 2–4 (noting that venture capital is a founder and
builder of the American economy, but it is “still a cottage industry” that is “small and fragile”).
95. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 23.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. That is, invested in by venture capital firms.
99. GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 15, at 11.
100. John H. Cochrane, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital 1–2 (Mar. 19, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/john.cochrane/research/
Papers/ venture.pdf).
101. Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture Capital Out Performance Holds
Steady in Period Ending Q1 2007 (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/
Q107VCPerformanceFINAL.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Standard & Poor 500 (“S&P 500”) is an index of U.S. equities that is commonly
used as a measuring stick for investments. Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sp500.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
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$14.80 in management fees.104 It is no surprise that managers want to
prevent carried interest legislation when the venture capital industry is
earning such astonishing profits.
Near-record figures indicate two things: First, venture capital remains
an extremely attractive form of investment and therefore, it is safe to infer
that there is no shortage of profits for limited partners.105 Second, venture
capitalists have increasing amounts of capital invested and because
management fees rise proportionately with capital invested and carried
interest increases proportionately with capital invested when investments
are profitable, there is no shortage of profits for general partners.106 Venture
capitalists’ arguments today against increased taxation are no different from
those made in the past, and they are entirely self-serving: “While venture
capitalists may argue vehemently for decreases in the capital gains rate, the
ones who would benefit most from such a reduction are the venture
capitalists themselves.”107
2. Encouraging Risk-Takers
A key component to the cost-benefit equation is the level of risk that
venture capitalists take on when helping fledging entrepreneurs develop
their businesses. With higher risks come the possibility of greater costs and
lower benefits. However, while encouraging risk takers is an important way
to stimulate economic growth,108 risk also benefits the risk-taker. Risk
occurs in all markets; attorneys on contingency, doctors, professional
athletes, and many other professions accept risk and pay general income
rates109 because the market automatically rewards risk-takers.110 Not only
does the market automatically reward risk, “[t]he progressive income tax
itself defrays risk: it takes a larger share of the gains when things turn out
well, a smaller share when things turn out poorly, and it allows a deduction
for losses.”111
Lower taxes are not necessary to encourage risk-takers like venture
capitalists. The purpose of the capital gains rate is not to encourage risk104. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 21–22.
105. Limited partners would not invest in funds that did not provide attractive returns on
investment.
106. Assuming an efficient market in which investors will only invest when returns are likely,
then high investment figures indicate that proportionate carried interest figures are increasing as
well.
107. Gompers, supra note 69, at 23.
108. See Maria Giduskova & Borja Larrain, International Risk-Taking, Volatility, and
Consumption Growth (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 06-17, 2006).
109. Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, supra note 16.
110. Testimony Concerning The Tax Treatment of Compensation Paid to Hedge, Private Equity
and Venture Capital Fund Managers, 110th Cong. 4 (July 11, 2007) (statement of Darryll K.
Jones, Professor of Law, Stetson University School of Law), available at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/073107testdj.pdf.
111. ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 8.
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taking; it is to encourage investment in capital assets.112 Therefore, the “risk
rationale for capital gains treatment does not apply.”113 Risk-taking is also
not always a beneficial goal because it can “encourage fund managers to
receive more compensation in the form of risky equity rather than cash
salary, which in turn may distort the operation of the venture capital
markets.”114
Venture capitalists actually assume much less risk than it appears.
Venture capitalists claim they “invest significant portions of [their] personal
savings,” yet admit that institutional investors provide “between 95 to 99
[%] of the capital.”115 Those investors accept the vast majority of risk
simply by having the most capital to lose. A manager does not accept risk
by acquiring “an ownership interest in the enterprise betting that his upside
will provide an ample economic reward.”116 The real risk is in the
possibility of loss, not of gain, and managers do not truly have downside
risk.117 Venture capitalists may believe they should be rewarded for their
risk-taking, but the “home run mentality”118 for taking on risky ventures
exists because they have the luxury of placing the burden of risk squarely
on the limited partners.
The real risk that occurs for managers is possible damage to their
reputations.119 Because investors in a venture capital fund are typically
passive, they evaluate managers prior to investing based on the managers’
investment track records before and during their investments.120 Managers
thus have a strong incentive to maintain a good reputation if they wish to
attract investors in the future. For that reason, reputation plays a key role in
ensuring competence of management and protecting against opportunism,121
not carried interest. Venture capitalists believe that risk should be
encouraged, but their argument fails most of all because the proposed
legislation does not remove risk from the equation; it will still encourage

112. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 56.
113. Id.
114. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 79. For discussion of the inefficiency of carried interest, see
supra Part V.B.3.
115. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 5.
116. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 7.
117. William R. Peterson, The Role of Consumer Preference Development in Incremental
Innovation: How Diamond Multimedia Helped Create the IPod, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1553, 1575
(2007); Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, supra note 8.
118. Peterson, supra note 117, at 1575 (quoting Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon
Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1765 (1994)). The home run mentality is the
willingness of venture capitalists to invest in more high-risk and high-reward companies because
they do not typically invest their own money, and therefore do not have as strong a disincentive to
take risks as a normal investor would.
119. Christopher Gulinello, Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive Investors,
70 ALB. L. REV. 303, 345 (2006).
120. Id. at 314.
121. Id. at 343.
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actual risk because it will “continue to treat as capital gains the portion of
the income attributable to a capital investment.”122
3. Providing Incentives
Carried interest is an important part of the cost-benefit equation because
it creates strong incentives for venture capitalists to actively manage
portfolio companies and maximize the potential of each investment. One
commentator suggests, “[t]he future health of venture capital depends upon
measures that will align the incentives of venture capital investors . . . ,
venture capitalists, and entrepreneurs who seek money to finance their
projects.”123 Venture capitalists consider the incentive aspect of carried
interest a necessary characteristic of investing that would be damaged by
increased taxation. However, incentives still exist if taxation increases
because even profits taxed 35% are better than none.
Additionally, venture capitalists refuse to use the same incentives
commonly found in other investment forms, but they could easily do so,
thus weakening their argument that low carried interest taxation is their
only incentive.124 The majority of venture capital funds do not provide the
basic incentive structure that other private equity funds use.125 Throughout
the private equity industry, managers’ rights to profits from investments are
typically limited until the investors have recouped their money.126 The most
common method is a “hurdle rate,”127 whereby proceeds of an investment
are first distributed to the investors to recover their initial investments, then
a set rate of return must be surpassed before the carried interest and
remaining profits distributions include the general partner.128 Once the
general partner meets the set rate of return, he may also be allowed to
“catch up” so that he receives the full 20% of carried interest based on the
entire investment and not solely on the returns after passing the hurdle.129
The hurdle rate discourages lazy management by preventing managers from
enjoying the benefits of investment returns when the investment has had
limited success. By refusing to use a hurdle rate, venture capitalists “reward
both superior and mediocre performance.”130
A capital gains rate is not necessary to provide incentives for managers
of venture capital. The attraction of profits itself is an incentive; profits are
simply taxed more if carried interest is treated as general income. Greater
profits do not occur solely due to the lower taxation rate; instead it merely
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 6.
Gompers, supra note 69, at 2.
Fleischer, supra note 12, at 78.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 84.
Masotti, supra note 6, at 222.
Fleischer, supra note 12, at 84.
Id. at 86.
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“motivate[s] the current structure of compensation received by fund
managers”.131 Venture capitalists use carried interest because it is highly
profitable, not because an incentive would not exist otherwise. Managers
are merely paid more handsomely for their work than they will be if
legislation is passed.
4. Leaving the Venture Capital Industry
Venture capitalists also believe that the threat of lower profits will
encourage managers to leave the industry entirely.132 Managers work in
venture capital because carried interest is the most efficient form of
compensation.133 If venture capital returns in the form of carried interest are
taxed at a higher rate, some managers will be tempted to accept higher
paying jobs elsewhere. However, that issue is more of a concern for venture
capitalists than it should be for Congress. Creating tax incentives to
artificially keep venture capitalists in the industry will only distort the job
market, just as it may distort managers’ investment decisions.134 Market
efficiencies will put the most capable people in the jobs where they will be
the most productive.135 The government does not pay people to work in
investment banks, so it should not tax those same workers less to encourage
them to work in venture capital. Instead, the proposed legislation taxes
workers according to the services they provide, not the industry in which
they work.136
5. Moving Offshore
As the threat of increased carried interest taxation looms, venture
capitalists portend a flight of their businesses out of the United States to
countries where they will be more profitable.137 Some politicians also
believe that increased taxation “could lead to an exodus of jobs and
companies from New York, and even from the country.”138 Much of venture
capitalists’ anxiety is the result of increasing competition from foreign
markets. One indicator, “the ability of the U.S. market to attract listings of

131. DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22717, TAXATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY
AND HEDGE FUND PARTNERSHIPS: CHARACTERIZATION OF CARRIED INTEREST 2 (Sept. 7, 2007).
132. See Bartlett, supra note 45 (noting that carried interest is the sole incentive for managers to
invest in “emerging growth companies”).
133. See Fleischer, supra note 41, at 2.
134. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 79.
135. ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 8–9.
136. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
137. See Bartlett, supra note 45.
138. Hernandez, supra note 4.
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foreign companies engaging in initial public offerings,”139 suggests that
there is “a decline in the U.S. competitive position.”140
While decreased competitiveness is a real concern for venture
capitalists, it is unlikely that they will consider exiting the American
market. In actuality, only the larger venture capital firms with more
resources are capable of significantly increasing their foreign investment,
let alone moving their businesses entirely.141 Furthermore, the United States
still provides “superior returns” and “adequate deal flow” which will
convince venture capitalists to remain.142 “[U.S.] venture funds formed
between 1983 and 1998 show consistently better returns than European
funds that commenced operations during the same period”143 and carried
interest treatment is unlikely to substantially change the two markets’
disparity.
A popular offshore location for venture capitalists that do decide to
work offshore is the United Kingdom.144 Discussion of increasing taxation
on carried interest has occurred recently in the United Kingdom, though
Parliament is unlikely to pass legislation similar to H.R. 2834 or S. 1624
and therefore, funds may be tempted to move abroad.145 In Europe, there are
at least thirteen different countries that treat carried interest as capital
gain.146 However, funds are not going to leave the United States simply
because offshore jurisdictions “extend the welcome mat.”147 Venture capital
firms will still incur U.S. taxes if they invest in companies based in the
United States, and they can “rarely perform [management] services from
abroad.”148
Even if the tax benefits abroad are greater than in the United States,
“[v]enture capitalism has done much better in America than Britain,
although the incentive from carried interest is bigger in the latter. The
industry’s success clearly depends on other things than tax.”149 Therefore, it
139. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 29 (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
140. Id. at x.
141. See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, GLOBAL TRENDS IN VENTURE CAPITAL: 2007
SURVEY
11
(2007),
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/
dtt_tmt_globaltrendsVC_2007.pdf.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Catarina Dantas Machado Rosa & Kristiina Raade, Profitability of Venture Capital
Investment in Europe and the United States 18 (European Comm’n, Economic Paper No. 245,
2006),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/
2006/ecp245en.pdf.
144. Bartlett, supra note 45.
145. Id.
146. MARPLES, supra note 131, at 3.
147. Bartlett, supra note 45.
148. ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 12 (quoting Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing
Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds).
149. Carried Away: One Tax Break for Private Equity is Unfair—But Don’t Blame the Buy-out
Barons, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 13 [hereinafter Carried Away].

500

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

would be a poor tax strategy to offer beneficial tax rates simply because of a
fear of losing venture capital business. A race to the bottom mentality does
not work with regulation, and it will not work with taxes.150
B. DEFINING CARRIED INTEREST AS CAPITAL GAIN
As is evident from the previous section, there are practical market
reasons for taxing venture capitalists the same as other private equity. In
addition, carried interest should be taxed as general income if Congress
views carried interest as conceptually different from capital gain. Venture
capitalists make different arguments in their attempts to define carried
interest as capital gain. First, they are paid by their investors for their
knowledge and experience, intangibles shared with the very entrepreneurs
who create a start-up and who are handsomely compensated for their own
non-capital investments.151 Portfolio companies are valued above book
value for those very intangibles that the venture capitalists provide, and for
which they should be compensated.152 Second, venture capitalists’
contribution should be defined in terms of providing a type of capital by
building “sweat equity” in their investments and therefore, profits are based
on a capital investment.153 Finally, treating the services venture capitalists
provide as capital is an efficient way to encourage investment.154 These
arguments attempt to prove that policy requires carried interest be treated as
capital gain. However, they dance around one main fact: Management is
simply a service provided to investors. Services are generally taxed as
ordinary income, not capital gain.155 Managers are paid for the advice they
provide and by the resulting increase in the sale price of a portfolio
company.156
1. Compensation for Non-Capital Investments
Venture capitalists believe that the carried interest they receive should
be treated as capital gain because they add tangible value to a portfolio
150. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 139, at 59.
151. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 5 (“This nurturing takes the form of money and
strategic management, including intangible guidance and goodwill—all equally important to the
company’s ultimate success.”); see also id. at 11 (discussing how entrepreneurs invest intangibles
such as ideas and labor).
152. See Denise Caruso, When Balance Sheets Collide With the New Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2007, § 3, at 34.
153. Sweat equity is ownership of an entity that a person earns by investing his time and effort
into building the business. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 9 (“As venture investors, we
assert that it is appropriate to reward investors of sweat equity with the same long-term capital
gain tax benefits that investors of financial equity receive.”).
154. See id. at 12 (“If sweat equity or intangibles are not recognized as having long term value
associated with them, then venture capitalists may as well be passive investors.”).
155. See Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 9–10.
156. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 6 (“entrepreneurs actively seek out venture investors
who can add value to their companies”).
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company and the returns they receive in carried interest are based on that
appreciation.157 Although management services are typically treated as
labor for tax purposes, venture capitalists believe the value they add to an
investment is a form of intangible capital, not labor.158 Entrepreneurs and
investors employ venture capitalists and pay them with carried interest
because they provide skill, knowledge and experience.159 Venture capitalists
are unlike normal investors who solely provide money because
management is a form of “human capital.”160
When an entrepreneur eventually sells his business, his profit is subject
to capital gains tax treatment.161 The entrepreneur has essentially made a
long term investment in his company, and tax legislation does not
differentiate between the value added to the company based on the
entrepreneur’s financial investment and the intellectual property or human
capital he invests.162 However, the proposed tax legislation will treat the
human capital provided by venture capitalists and the capital provided by
entrepreneurs very differently.163 Venture capitalists are jealous of the
relative proposed tax treatment entrepreneurs will receive and rightfully so;
the human capital venture capitalists provide is significant. Before venture
capitalists step in, the entrepreneur’s company is an “original business plan”
that is “essentially illiquid and worthless” until venture capitalists apply an
“experienced hand.”164 Venture capitalists are instrumental in maximizing
returns on entrepreneurship by providing both funding and expertise to a
start-up.165 Yet they will not benefit from the lower capital gains tax if the
proposed tax legislation is passed.
Market valuation of companies supports the argument that venture
capitalists can provide intangible capital.166 Venture capitalists bid on
potential investments based on the intangibles of an entrepreneur’s ideas167
157. Venture capitalists profit when they are paid for their equity in the company, so their
efforts to make the company successful, and therefore to add to the value of their investment, is
ultimately done to increase the sale price of a portfolio company. See id. at 5 (intangible guidance
is “equally important to the company’s ultimate success”).
158. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, NVCA Board Members Meet in
Washington to Discuss Stifling Effects of Carried Interest Tax Bill on Start-Up Companies and
Innovation: Venture Capitalists Continue to Urge Members of Congress Not to Harm Emerging
Entrepreneur Community (Sept. 18, 2007).
159. See Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 7 (“The common theme in all these instances
is . . . [contribution of] skill and knowledge . . . .”).
160. Masotti, supra note 6, at 219.
161. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 6.
162. See Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, supra note 16.
163. H.R. 2834 taxes investment services as general income, but entrepreneurs’ labor is not an
investment service. See H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
164. GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 15, at 8–10.
165. Id. at 9.
166. See Caruso, supra note 152.
167. Burnham’s Beat, Carried Interest Debate Cont.: The Death of Sweat Equity?, June 25,
2007, http://billburnham.blogs.com/burnhamsbeat/2007/06/carried-interes.html.

502

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

and those same companies are commonly valued over asset value simply
because of intangibles like those that venture capitalists provide.168
However, while carried interest may be a return on human capital, market
valuation of portfolio companies alone does not explain why carried interest
is a return on capital instead of labor. Venture capitalists must show that the
human capital they provide, in the form of management, should not be
treated as services just like other investment advice.
2. Redefining Services as Sweat Equity
Venture capitalists will attempt to define their contributions as
necessary to avoid increased taxation. If they contribute capital to start-ups,
then carried interest is capital gain. However, if venture capitalists provide
services, then carried interest is general income. The problem venture
capitalists face when trying to define carried interest as capital gain is that
they provide very little capital; limited partners provide the lion’s share of
money.169 Furthermore, if venture capitalists were approached for financial
investment, then they would simply be providing high-risk credit and not
the unique hands-on management they claim.170 Yet venture capitalists
cannot admit to simply providing services without seeming to agree that
carried interest is general income. Therefore, venture capitalists are forced
to define carried interest between the two poles.
Venture capitalists claim the result of their investment is sweat equity171
to avoid this dilemma; their services are theoretically converted into equity
by being an intangible capital investment.172 Although limited partners
provide most of the money, the profits on venture capital include more than
what the limited partners would have received if they had made similar
investments elsewhere.173 Venture capitalists do indeed add something
intangible, but it exits in the form of capital. They believe this justifies
treating carried interest as a return on capital investment.174 Venture
capitalists often use partnerships because “the appeal of the partnership
form is its convenience as a method of pooling together labor and capital,”
but pooling is not unique to partnerships that use carried interest.175 Returns
on various forms of investment are often taxed as general income even

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Caruso, supra note 152.
Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 5.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9.
See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 158.
The reputation, knowledge, and goodwill is a valuable contribution provided by venture
capitalists that is absent in simple hands-off stock ownership. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note
20, at 6.
174. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 158 (“This type of intangible
investment . . . is what Congress intended for capital gains treatment.”).
175. Fleischer, supra note 41, at 25–26.
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when “blurring”176 the line between labor and capital.177 Other business
arrangements that pool together labor and capital only treat them as pure
capital gain if there is a true entrepreneurial risk.178 Furthermore, the present
proposed legislation is clearly intended to address both those situations
when services are provided without any real financial investment, and when
both services and capital investment are involved.179
Venture capitalists define the services they provide equivocally to take
advantage of tax benefits. They claim venture capital is inherently about
creating capital investment because they take an active part in
entrepreneurship by both investing in start-ups and actually being involved
in business decisions while on the board of directors.180 However, while the
capital gains rate exists to promote investment by increasing access to
capital,181 it is not intended to benefit every person generally involved in
investment.182 Tax legislation simply would have no way to differentiate
between mere investors that are essentially granted board positions by
virtue of the size of their investments (like major stockholders in
corporations), and investors that somehow provide some type of valuable
management. The purpose of a lower capital gains rate is to encourage
capital formation by taxing direct investors at a lower rate, not the venture
capitalists who manage direct investment183 and merely provide services to
the investors. The present legislation does not propose to remove the capital
gains rate entirely184 because there are still accepted benefits to capital
formation.185 Taxing venture capitalists is not inconsistent with that policy
because the portion of their equity return resulting from capital investment
is still treated as such.186

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

MARPLES, supra note 131, at 4.
Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
See H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 12 (capital gains tax policy was enacted to
encourage entrepreneurship and Congress intended for it to apply to both the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist).
181. Stephen Moore & John Silvia, The ABCs of the Capital Gains Tax (CATO Inst., Policy
Analysis No. 242, 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=
1101&full=1.
182. See Carried Away, supra note 149 (capital gains treatment was “originally intended to
reward small-business owners and entrepreneurs”).
183. Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 16.
184. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
185. Increasing access to capital dampens business cycles and decreases macroeconomic
volatility, even if it raises the assumption of risks by investors systematically. Orszag Testimony,
supra note 2, at 2.
186. Only returns that are due to investment services without a proportionate capital investment
are taxed as general income. H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
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3. Efficiency
Capital gains taxation exists because making long-term capital
investments inexpensive is an efficient way to encourage activity in the
investment market.187 Venture capitalists believe that if encouraging longterm capital investment is a policy goal, then the services they provide to
long-term capital investors should be as well.188 After all, it would be
unreasonable to expect lay investors to spend the time and energy that
venture capitalists do in choosing investment opportunities and helping
them grow.189 Defining carried interest as a capital gain might encourage
more venture capital investment because potential venture capitalists would
be attracted by the industry’s lower taxation, but it would have other,
negative efficiency consequences.
Carried interest is used in place of salary and other typical types of
payment for labor, so taxing carried interest at a lower rate than “other
forms of compensation . . . [can lead] to distortions in employment,
organizational form and compensation decisions.”190 While other service
industries base decisions on taxation for labor, venture capitalists structure
their business as partnerships and use carried interest specifically because of
tax incentives for capital investment.191 Taxing carried interest less than
general income “violates the principles of both horizontal and vertical
equity;” people who earn the same amounts pay different taxes merely
because of the “form of the income” they receive and people who are paid
more do not necessarily pay more taxes.192 If workers and investors
structure their activities in certain forms solely based on tax reasons, then it
is inefficient for the market because it creates “deadweight loss” by
distorting investment behavior.193
Applying the lower capital gains rate to carried interest is “widely
considered to be inconsistent with basic federal income tax principles”194
including limiting costs on the market in the form of externalities.195
Control of externalities is crucial to an efficient economy.196 Venture capital
creates positive externalities such as innovation,197 but carried interest

187. See Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 15–16.
188. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 12.
189. Id. at 6 (venture capitalists themselves do not have the ability to divide their time between
more than five to seven director seats).
190. MARPLES, supra note 131, at 3–4.
191. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 1.
192. MARPLES, supra note 131, at 3–4.
193. Fleischer, supra note 41, at 19.
194. Knoll, supra note 13, at 4.
195. See Peterson, supra note 117, at 1569–1570.
196. See Knoll, supra note 13, at 4–5 (an “all-parties perspective” is necessary when
considering consequences of tax policy); see also Peterson, supra note 117, at 1569 (externalities
create market failures).
197. Peterson, supra note 117, at 1559.
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creates negative externalities in the form of market distortion.198 It is the job
of the government to subsidize the positive externalities while taxing the
negative ones.199 The proposed legislation creates a consistent and efficient
tax policy by treating carried interest as general income, but applying the
capital gains rate if venture capitalists invest their own capital.
C. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SHIFTING THE TAX
BURDEN
Carried interest is a “common feature of partnerships” outside of the
private equity industry.200 These partnerships may unwittingly be subjected
to higher taxation if Congress passes the new legislation. Venture capitalists
point out a bevy of “unintended consequences”201 that they believe will
occur as a result of an increase in taxation on carried interest. First,
increasing taxation will merely shift the burden to investors who will have
to pay higher fees for investment management,202 and to the relatively poor
investors.203 Second, increasing taxation will hurt small business, which
relies on money from venture capital,204 and pensioners, whom the federal
government should protect from increased taxation.205 Finally, venture
capital investment creates jobs and sparks innovation essential to the
American economy, and therefore the economy will be harmed by a lack of
venture capital investment if higher taxation occurs.206
1. Shifting the Tax Burden
Increasing taxation on carried interest will place a heavier burden on
general partners, but the shift is likely to be temporary.207 “A shift of the tax
burden away from limited partners and towards general partners will likely
lead limited partners to pay more (before tax) to general partners to
compensate for the shift in tax burden.”208 The increased tax burden will
probably change the way both venture capitalists and investors act in the
market.209 If the cost of venture capital investment rises, then investors will
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 79.
Peterson, supra note 117, at 1569.
Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 11.
See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 7.
Knoll, supra note 13, at 6.
Because capital-intensive investors are wealthy by definition, and those investors that earn
equity through services will not be able to benefit from the capital gains rate.
204. See Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 4 (venture capital creates “new companies that
quite simply would not exist if this capital were not available”).
205. See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Alison Fitzgerald, Pension Fund Group Drops Opposition to
Tax Change, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/05/
bloomberg/bxpension.php.
206. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 2.
207. Knoll, supra note 13, at 6.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 7.
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be discouraged from entering the market. General partners may also raise
management fees, or request a larger share of the profits from the limited
partners.210 Furthermore, venture capitalists may require more equity from
portfolio companies in return for their investments.
Though decreasing venture capital investment will directly affect the
total capital available to start-ups, it will not be an unforeseen consequence
of taxation like venture capitalists suggest. Shifting the tax burden
commonly affects market strategies.211 By making certain forms of
investment activity more or less expensive, taxation creates efficient
behavior.212 The ability to shift taxation for that very purpose is the driving
force behind tax policy.213 If taxation of carried interest increases, there will
be fewer instances when the rate meant specifically for capital investments
is applied to services. Presently, taxation controls the market; venture
capitalists even select a business structure based almost entirely on tax
benefits.214 If carried interest is taxed as general income, venture capitalists
will act efficiently by investing solely where opportunities are profitable on
their merits.215 Furthermore, although the tax burden may shift back to
limited partners, congressmen have already said that carried interest
taxation is about policy decisions and closing loopholes, not about raising
tax revenues.216
A result of increased carried interest taxation will also be to foreclose
use of the capital gains rate by anyone other than capital investors.
Somewhat ironically, venture capitalists decry increased taxation because
only the capital-intensive investors will benefit.217 By preventing noncapital investors from enjoying the benefits of the capital gains tax rate, the
burden is shifted away from the rich to investors that cannot or do not
provide tangible capital. Investors are the ones that have the wealth, while
managers provide the real work in the form of sweat equity.218 Therefore,
carried interest taxation “ends up penalizing labor by reserving beneficial

210. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 8 (“This rule is likely to affect the economic deal
between the service partner and investors.”).
211. Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 305–08 (1993).
212. See Robert J. Peroni, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign
Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 486 (1999) (eliminating tax benefits can encourage efficient
use of capital).
213. JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. OF THE U.S. CONG., THE INEFFICIENCY OF TARGETED TAX
POLICIES (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/targets.htm
[hereinafter JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. REPORT].
214. Solomon Testimony, supra note 36, at 1.
215. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. REPORT, supra note 213 (efficient tax policies “allocate
resources to their most highly valued uses”).
216. Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, supra note 16.
217. Mitchell Testimony, supra note 20, at 9 (claiming that increasing taxation on carried
interest is the equivalent of subsidizing the wealthy).
218. Id.
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tax treatment only for the providers of capital.”219 However, there are two
problems with such claims: first, labor is commonly taxed as general
income220 and it is solely the carried interest loophole that would be closed;
second, tax encourages capital formation because it benefits everyone
indirectly,221 whereas the rich would otherwise be encouraged to keep their
capital out of the marketplace, harming the economy.
2. Hurting the People Using and Investing In Venture Capital
A great deal of political capital will be required to pass carried interest
taxation because it may negatively affect a variety of groups including
pensioners,222 small business owners,223 real estate owners,224 and minority
businesspeople.225 Pensioners are paying close attention to the carried
interest debate because it could result in venture capitalists shifting greater
costs to the investors. The remaining groups are concerned that increased
taxation will increase the cost of capital to their businesses. However, many
of the concerns expressed are relatively unfounded.
Real estate investment represented only 13% of partnership income
distributed in 2004, compared with 63% for securities partnerships,226 and it
is only those partnerships that provide investment services that will be
taxed.227 Ironically, minority and women investors attacking carried interest
taxation are receiving funding from the private equity industry, which
makes their claims seem disingenuous.228 Similarly, President Bush has also
jumped into the debate claiming that small businesses must be protected.229
Such support for trickle-down legislation fails because a low capital gains
rate and therefore, also taxation on carried interest, has “modest effects” on
“capital formation and economic activity.”230
219. Burnham’s Beat, supra note 167.
220. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 52–53 (arguing that if
compensation is based on services, then it should be treated as ordinary income).
221. Lower taxes stimulate economic growth. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. REPORT, supra
note 213.
222. See Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, supra note 8 (“The private equity industry has
tried to create the impression that public employee pensions will be damaged by this reform.”).
223. Kevin Drawbaugh, Business Group Backs Carried Interest Tax Break, REUTERS, Sept. 4,
2007.
224. Holzer, supra note 3.
225. Minority Group Joins Fight Over Carried Interest, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Sept. 5, 2007,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/05/minority-group-joins-fight-over-carried-interest/
[hereinafter Minority Group Joins Fight].
226. DR. JOHN RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
INCREASING CARRIED INTEREST TAX RATES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/espkx2nh7rnh2oeohbh253lo5guaaiucqfd4erqpaqgnvme
oron6zhpt4fcx3thuqpjtqvu6pgxb4fvw3ottf52n6sa/07carriedinterest_study.pdf.
227. H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
228. Minority Group Joins Fight, supra note 225.
229. Drawbaugh, supra note 3.
230. Orszag Testimony, supra note 2, at 16.
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Pensioners are not as concerned by carried interest taxation as venture
capitalists claim. Regular investors could be hurt if general partners pass
costs onto them, but the cost per investor should be minimal because it will
be spread throughout entire pension funds that typically diversify their
holdings.231 The quality of investment management should also not be
affected by increased taxation.232 Even pension funds have agreed that
“[t]he argument that this is about the interest of retired public employees is
ludicrous.”233 Pensioners are unlikely to be significantly hurt by shifting
costs because if the market had the flexibility to allow managers to charge
greater fees, then they would have already done so.234
3. Venture Capital’s Place in the American Economy
Some view venture capital as the life-blood of the American economy
because it creates jobs and sparks innovation.235 “Venture capital is the only
industry in the proposed carried interest legislation that creates new
companies, industries and technologies.”236 Increased taxation could result
in decreased investment, which would slow small business growth and lead
to a weaker economy.237
“[T]here is considerable evidence that countries with better financial
markets, like the United States, enjoy more rapid economic growth, which
creates more new jobs nationwide.”238 Financial markets can easily be
weakened when the costs of investing are too high because investors will
put their money wherever it is cheapest to invest. “Weaker U.S. capital
markets mean higher costs of capital for U.S. companies, reduced asset
values, fewer jobs, and less economic activity across the entire country.”239
However, while carried interest taxation will affect after-tax profitability for
venture capital managers, it will not directly affect total capital invested. As
long as venture capital is still profitable relative to other investment options,
entrepreneurs will still have a source of investment. The American
economy will be hurt if entrepreneurship is stifled, but venture capital
investing will exist as long as investors are willing to provide money.

231. Stephen Labaton & Jenny Anderson, Pension Effect From Tax Plan Is Called Slight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at C1.
232. Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, supra note 8.
233. ARON-DINE, supra note 67, at 12 (quoting Alison Fitzgerald, “Buyout Firms” Tax Rise
Wouldn’t Hurt Workers, Pension Funds Say, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 11, 2007).
234. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION REPORT, PART I, supra note 34, at 58.
235. GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 15, at 5 (“the nation’s venture capital backed companies
employed over 10.4 million American workers in high-quality jobs and generated $2.3 trillion in
revenue in 2006.”).
236. Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 158.
237. RUTLEDGE, supra note 226.
238. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 139, at ix.
239. Id. at 23.
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Changing the tax treatment of managers is simply unlikely to have a
significant effect on entrepreneurship overall.
VI. CONCLUSION
Venture capitalists fail to provide convincing arguments against carried
interest taxation because tax legislation on carried interest has been
proposed for practical policy reasons. Venture capitalists help to nurture
small businesses in America that might fail without additional funding and
management expertise. However, while present capital gains taxation may
provide indirect benefits to the American economy, it also benefits venture
capitalists in a way that creates tax inequalities. The market provides strong
evidence that venture capitalists are able to withstand an increase in
taxation and they are unlikely to avoid the industry or more their business to
another country. Even with greater taxes, they will have significant
incentives to actively manage their portfolio companies and take investment
risks.
Increased taxation of carried interest is also appropriate because venture
capitalists are providing a service, even if they add tangible value to the
companies they invest in. Regardless of how to define the contribution that
venture capitalists provide, it is essentially different from capital
investment. The market will be more efficient if the carried interest
loophole is closed and investors based their decisions purely on the merit of
their options and not the tax benefits.
The proposed legislation is far more carefully crafted than its drafters
are given credit for: It treats capital gains income different only in the
unique instance that it is the result of investment services without a
proportionate personal investment.240 Alternative tax legislation that has
been proposed by venture capitalists and other industries that attack
increased carried interest taxation are simply misguided. The same groups
lobbying against the present legislation will be even more displeased if
taxes are raised on the top 1% of income earners, or if the capital gains tax
is raised.241
Small business owners, minorities, pensioners, and everyone outside of
the private equity industry should be pleased with H.R. 2834 because the
present tax system is stacked against them. It is unreasonable to avoid an
increase in tax for venture capitalists simply because the costs of investment
may shift to investors or entrepreneurs in the market. The American
economy is strong because taxation creates a relatively level playing field,
not because Congress provides incentives for investment management.
Although venture capital plays a vital role in nurturing promising U.S.

240. H.R. 2834 § 710(c)(1), 110th Cong. (2007).
241. See Hernandez, supra note 4.
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businesses, the industry will survive when venture capitalists pay taxes the
same way as the average American.
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